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The General Accounting Office (GAO) has stated that the Department of
Defense (DoD) beheves it is better to overbuy inventory items than to manage with
just the right amount of stock. This thesis asserts that Navy inventory managers do
not have a general tendency to overbuy items, but rather make rational purchasing
decisions influenced and motivated by the environment of rewards and penalties in
which they work. It is also asserted that Navy inventory managers are risk adverse
due to the nature of their environment. Personal stockout costs are examined as one
ofthe key factors influencing decision-making and risk adverse behavior. This thesis
introduces a conceptual model that describes the Navy inventory management
decision-making environment. This model shows the relationship between personal
stockout costs, required service levels, cost considerations, and planning horizons
across the different decision-making levels in the Navy. This study concludes that
readiness-based performance measures must be changed to incorporate a cost focus,
and that the risk facing inventory managers due to personal stockout costs needs to
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The General Accounting Office (GAO) has stated that the
Department of Defense (DoD) believes it is better to overbuy
items than to manage with just the right amount of stock
[Ref.l:p.6]. GAO has also contended that the problem of high
inventory levels can be reduced or eliminated through better
training of personnel in commercial inventory practices
[Ref.2:p.4]. However, recent research has shown that this is not
the case [Refs.3,4]. The many differences between the military
and private sector, including the unique environment regarding
inventory management decisions, have not been considered in GAO's
findings
.
It is contended in this research that one of the causes of
excess inventory is not some general tendency among Navy
inventory managers to overbuy items due to a lack of training.
It is asserted that Navy inventory managers make rational
decisions, seeking to maximize their personal utility in response
to the environment they work in. To understand inventory
managers' decision-making behavior, it is necessary to understand
the environment of rewards and penalties in which they work.
If the personal risks arising from a stockout, or the
consequence of a shortage, for example are significantly greater
than the risk of carrying excess inventory to an inventory
manager, that greater risk is going to affect a manager's
purchase behavior. There are several issues that are unique to
the military that contribute to this risk. Specifically;, the
incentives and penalties, and environmental influences that
inventory managers are subjected to with respect to their
purchase decisions contribute to a high personal stockout cost,
and is a significant factor in motivating their behavior.
This research examines the unique environment and issues
that affect inventory manager decision-making, and show the
important relationship between stockout costs, service levels and
the performance measures that influence behavior. This research
discusses the extent to which Navy inventory managers are "risk
adverse" in response to their environment with the intent on
revealing areas for potential improvement to the system.
B. PREVIOUS RELATED STUDIES
Randle (1996) studied training in commercial logistics
practices to improve inventory management in the Navy [Ref.3].
He concluded that training in commercial inventory practices
would not appreciably improve inventory management in the Navy,
and that many commercial logistics practices are also
inappropriate for the Navy. One key reason cited is that the
causes of excess inventory are generally unrelated to training.
Some of these causes include: Decreasing requirements due to
downsizing and decommissions, lack of asset visibility, lack of
customer confidence, contracting regulations, and item manager
incentives. Steiner (1996) studied training in commercial
logistic practices to improve inventory management in the Army.
He also identified that excess inventory was not the result of
insufficient or inappropriate training, and discussed similar
causes for excess. He concluded that additional training would
not improve the military inventory management system [Ref . 4]
.
Reasons cited include the differences between the military and
private sector in the political, economic, legal, and social
environment. A summary of the causes of excess inventory as a
result of his research is included as Appendix A.
Martin (1996) conducted research on the performance measures
and reward structures applicable to DoD inventory management
[Ref. 5]. She found that the reward system, or incentives in
place in DoD inventory management cause inefficiencies, and
specifically encourages higher levels of inventory. She
suggested additional performance measures such as inventory
turnover, total costing, and separate readiness criteria as a
means to motivate inventory managers and users to lower on-hand
inventory levels by linking these measures to formal rewards
available to employees. She concluded that it is necessary that
inventory management performance be measured with criteria that
support inventory reduction.
3
This thesis research builds upon the previous studies cited
above with the specific focus outlined below.
C. SCOPE OF THESIS
The topic of this thesis is applicable to all of DoD, but it
is specifically relevant to the Navy. The focus is on the
purchase decisions of secondary items managed by item managers at
the Navy Inventory Control Points (NAVICP) in Philadelphia and
Mechanicsburg,- PA, and the relationship of several factors at
various levels in the Navy inventory management hierarchy. The
term "inventory manager" is used to describe any manager involved
with inventory management decision-making; and includes item
managers specifically. This study includes a discussion of the
decision-making process inventory managers undertake, and the
factors that influence their decisions, such as high stockout
costs. Emphasis is placed on the unique environment that the
Navy imposes upon inventory decision makers at all levels, as
opposed to that in the private sector. Risk adverse behavior is
discussed, and its significance is considered in the context of
the inventory decision-making environment. Lastly, a model that
shows the relationship of personal stockout costs, service
levels, cost focus, and decision-making/planning horizon for
inventory managers at different levels is presented and
discussed.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This thesis seeks to answer the following questions:
1. Are Navy inventory managers "risk adverse" in their
decision-making? If so, why, and what factors contribute to
this? (Chapter II)
2. Does the current incentive environment for inventory
managers encourage higher levels of inventory?
(Chapter III)
3. What is the relationship between stockout costs, service
levels, and inventory cost considerations, and how do these
affect inventory policy makers, managers, and users
throughout the Navy hierarchy? (Chapter III)
4. To what extent are risk and cost considerations
incorporated into inventory decisions? (Chapter IV)
5. What changes in the inventory decision-making
environment could make managerial decision-making more "risk
neutral," and can some factors/issues that affect Navy
inventory manager decision-making be manipulated to
encourage different behavior ie. lower inventory levels?
(Chapter VI)
E . METHODOLOGY
The author has obtained information from a variety of
sources including previous research, unclassified DoD and Navy
documents, GAO reports, and relevant published material cited
herein. Other data and information were obtained through
personal interviews with key personnel including Navy item
managers, their supervisors, and policy makers from the Navy
Inventory Control Points (NAVICP)
.
F. ORGANIZATION
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter I
provides some background, previous related studies, scope,
methodology, and associated thesis research questions. Chapter
II is about decision-making under uncertainty with reference to
utility theory and risk aversion, and discusses the relevance of
utility theory to Navy inventory management. Chapter III
discusses personal stockout costs as they apply to inventory
management decision-making, customer service levels, safety
stocks, and one of the Navy's primary performance indicators for
inventory management. Supply Material Availability (SMA) are also
discussed as they relate to stockout costs. A model is presented
to show the relationship of these factors over all levels of
decision makers. Chapter IV discusses inventory management cost
focus, cost versus readiness, risk, and the current incentives
and performance measures which influence behavior. These issues
are then related to the Inventory Decision-Making Environment
Model introduced in Chapter III. Chapter V validates the model
presented in Chapter III to determine if it accurately describes
the Navy inventory management environment, and Chapter VI
presents a summary and the conclusions of this thesis.

II. DECISION-MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
A. INTRODUCTION
One of the many functions of Navy inventory managers is to
make purchase and replenishment decisions on secondary items.
Although there are a number of tools available to assist them
such as EOQ-based mathematical models, much of their decision-
making relies upon their experience and subjective judgment.
Only changes to their personal risk assessment can create changes
in their decision process. This is where the importance of the
factors that influence their decision-making is seen.
This chapter will look at basic utility theory and decision-
making under uncertainty to provide a backdrop for the subsequent
discussion on the factors that influence inventory manager
decision-making.
B. UTILITY THEORY
This thesis asserts that Navy inventory managers make
rational purchase decisions, and seek to maximize the value of
their own personal utility given the environment within which
they work. This is the basic hypothesis of utility theory
(Bernoulli hypothesis) [Ref . 6 :p, 357] . The "utility" of a
decision can include personal career potential, income, job
security, pride in performance, or any number of similar aspects
of the job. Utility reflects the value individuals place on the
outcome or consequences of their decisions, and one can see that
there are a great number of things that can affect or influence
an individual's decisions.
Utility in this case can also refer to the satisfaction an
inventory manager gets from fulfilling his or her objectives.
These objectives include personal benefits that result from doing
a "good job" by ensuring the appropriate level of stock is
available, or by meeting other objectives such as personal career
development and advancement considerations. The environment that
an inventory manager works in defines what a "good job" is, and
currently in the Navy environment, higher inventory levels mean
doing a "better job" [Ref . 3 :p. 67]
.
The general notion of utility is used in this thesis to
explain the idea of risk aversion and its role in an inventory
manager's decision-making.
C. RISK AVERSION
A utility function is derived from a relationship between
utility and benefit resulting from a decision. The shape of this
utility function determines how the individual makes decisions
over alternative choices, and depends on many things. For this
discussion, the focus is on the individual's relative aversion to
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risk when facing the environment surrounding the inventory
management decision process.
An individual who is "risk adverse" can be characterized in
a simple case as one who would be willing to accept a guaranteed
payoff of less than the expected benefit of a particular decision
with an uncertain outcome. The degree of risk aversion is
related to a decreasing marginal utility for benefits
[Ref .7 :p. 54] , as shown graphically in Figure 1:
Utility
6 E(X) Benefit
Figure 1: Risk Adverse Behavior versus Risk Neutral Behavior
Figure 1 above graphically depicts risk adverse and risk
neutral behavior. The curve represents the risk adverse
behavior, whereas the straight line shows risk neutral behavior.
It can be seen that point G, which is less of a benefit than the
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expected value E(X) of a given decision, actually represents a
greater utility to the risk adverse individual than the higher
benefit expected value. In contrast, the strait line shows risk
neutral behavior where the expected value is the utility
maximizing point.
A risk neutral individual in contrast to a risk adverse
individual always makes decisions consistent with maximizing
expected benefit or value, because their utility will vary
linearly with benefit received [Ref . 7 :p. 55] . Many have argued
that from an organizational perspective, all decisions should be
made in accordance with risk neutrality so that the objective of
maximizing expected benefit is achieved [Ref. 7: p. 55]. However,
from an individual perspective, risk aversion is the predominant
criteria used for decision-making. Therein lies a potential
source of significant disparity between what an organization
wants and what a manager implements.
D. APPLICATION OF UTILITY THEORY TO INVENTORY MANAGEMENT
This author contends that the purchase behavior seen by Navy
inventory managers is risk adverse. The primary reason for this
aversion to risk is the high personal stockout costs encountered
by the inventory manager. This risk of stockout is significant
because the environment in which inventory management decision
makers work creates a "penalty" for a stockout, or low material
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availability, that is much greater than the "penalty" for
carrying excess stock. This high risk is perpetuated in the
performance measures used and the incentive system applied to
inventory managers. This environment directly affects an
inventory manager's utility function and influences his or her
purchase behavior.
If high personal stockout costs or other issues compel risk
adverse behavior from inventory managers in their purchase
decisions, they may be maximizing personal utility rather than
seeking the organization's highest expected value. Consequently
their conservative (risk adverse) decision-making may not be the
best purchase decisions for a cost and budget conscious Navy.
Thus, it is to the Navy's benefit to eliminate, with the
appropriate environment, the disparity between these
perspectives. In order to facilitate this analysis, it becomes
necessary to understand the existing environment facing Navy
inventory managers.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter presented an overview of utility theory.
Individuals making rational decisions will seek to maximize the
value of their own personal utility given the constraints placed
upon them by the environment they face. A brief discussion was
also presented on risk aversion. These topics are relevant to
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Navy inventory manager decision-making since they help describe
the fact that although they are making rational decisions in the
execution of their jobs, there are external factors that affect
their utility function and influence their behavior. This
behavior could result in purchase decisions that are not as cost
effective for the Navy as they could be. By understanding their
decision-making environment, and the factors that compel managers
to be risk adverse, one should be able to explain the reasons why
inventory levels might be higher than the organization would
expect. The primary factors that affect inventory manager
decision-making, such as high personal stockout costs, are




Stockout costs are the consequence of a material shortage
[Ref . 8 :p. 14] . This consequence does not necessarily have to be
an economic one. Two different perspectives on stockout costs
are distinguished between in this chapter: The organizational
costs of a stockout for an item, and the personal costs of a
stockout to a decision maker. The focus of this thesis is on the
latter, the costs to an inventory manager and how that cost
affects their decision-making.
This chapter discusses the environment that managers are
faced with, particularly focusing on how personal stockout costs
are applied to inventory management decision-making. Customer
service levels, safety stocks, and one of the Navy's primary
performance indicators for item managers. Supply Material
Availability (SMA) , are also discussed as they relate to stockout
costs. Lastly, a model is developed showing the
interrelationship of personal stockout costs, safety levels, and
the focus of cost factors in inventory management.
B. PERSONAL STOCKOUT COSTS
A common understanding of stockout costs is that they are an
economic consequence of a shortage. The extent of this cost
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depends upon the reaction of the customer, or applicable decision
maker to the out-of-stock condition [Ref.8:p.l4] Different
customers, decision makers, and policy makers will experience
different costs, and will consequently react differently to a
stockout condition.
It is very difficult, from a policy maker's standpoint, to
quantify the stockout cost of an item in the Navy. While the
private sector can use lost profits or increased costs resulting
from backorders, or lost sales to estimate stockout costs, such
measures are not applicable in the military. The "cost" of a
stockout to the military can be lost readiness or even military
defeat including death of personnel.
However, personal stockout costs, which are also difficult
to quantify, are key to understanding the influence on inventory
manager behavior. Instead of a quantifiable cost such as a lost
sale in the private sector, a personal stockout cost implies that
an individual's behavior will generate an explicit and direct
consequence to them personally. This consequence may not be
monetary, but nonetheless it is a cost in that it represents lost
benefit to the inventory manager.
For example, an item manager may make a decision to purchase
or hold X quantity of a particular inventory item. If this
quantity is not sufficient and a stockout results, that item
manager may become subject to negative attention for his or her
work, perhaps as a result of not meeting the SMA goal or just for
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the fact that a stockout did occur. It has been stated that Navy
item managers perceive that the worst thing they can do, short of
breaking the law, is to run out of stock on an item [Ref . 3 :p. 67]
.
This situation may have an adverse impact on that item manager's
professional reputation or even promotion potential, endangering
career security or some other personal cost. Clearly, there is a
cost to the item manager for making "wrong decisions"; a cost
that a rational, risk adverse decision maker would take action to
avoid.
The general condition seen in the Navy is that the penalty
or personal cost to the decision maker for a stockout situation
is much higher than the penalty for maintaining high or excess
levels of inventory to avoid a stockout situation [Refs.3,5].
This is the fundamental concept that suggests inventory managers
display risk adverse behavior due to the environment they work in
and the incentives that influence their behavior. The degree of
risk aversion varies from individual to individual, however the
general idea that rational decision makers will avoid these high
personal stockout costs is clear.
C. READINESS, SERVICE LEVELS, AND SUPPLY MATERIAL AVAILABILITY
Service levels indicate the ability to meet customer demands
from stock immediately, or within a timely manner. When stockout
costs are difficult to quantify, such as the case in the
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military, often service levels will be set to measure inventory
performance [Ref . 8 :p.232]
.
1 . Performance Indicators
There are a number of performance indicators that are used
to measure inventory management effectiveness. One primary
problem with the indicators such as supply material availability
(SMA) , average customer wait time (ACWT) , and number of
backorders is that they all measure and promote readiness with
little or no focus on cost. The result is that the indicators
used actually influence behavior by becoming part of the
decision-making environment. Decision makers striving to do a
good job, and meet goals by achieving performance within a given
acceptable range of the performance indicators, will be motivated
to do what it takes to be successful in their environment. In
these cases, performance indicators that measure readiness will
ensure that efforts will be directed towards optimizing readiness
(without regard for cost) . Several of the key performance
indicators and the resulting behaviors found by Randle (1996) are
summarized in Table 1.
Performance Measure Resulting Behavior
Supply Material Avail. (SMA) Keep higher inventories
Average Customer Wait Time
(ACWT)
Cancel documents that cannot
be filled quickly
Number of Backorders Cancel documents that cannot
be filled quickly
Number of orders shipped 1. Split large orders and/or
2. Ship small orders first
Pounds of Material Shipped Ship large or heavy orders
first.
Table 1: Performance Measures, adapted from reference 3, p. 67
2. Supply Material Availability (SMA)
A common measure of effectiveness (MOE) for readiness that
is directly related to service levels is supply material
availability (SMA) . Although average customer wait time (ACWT)
is becoming more important in evaluating inventory management
performance, SMA is still the primary performance indicator for
item managers [Refs.3,5], and in the Navy is analogous to
customer service level. Navy policy currently is to maintain SMA
at 85% on average over all items for most programs. However,
budget and funding constraints in FY97 have meant that only 74%
to 7 5% is currently being achieved in many programs, and even
less in others [Ref.ll]. The goal assumes that 85% of the time,
a demand can be filled from stock immediately or in a timely
manner. This also means that 15% of the time, there will be a
stockout; and consequently, 15% of the time, a decision maker
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will be subject to stockout costs. Again, however, due to
austere funding this fiscal year (FY97) , chances for stockout
across all items is much higher, up to 26% [Ref.ll].
If it is generally accepted and understood by all
stakeholders that 85% SMA is the goal, and that it is
"acceptable" to have a stockout 15% of the time, then the
established environment facing the decision maker would not be in
conflict with the inventory manager trying to achieve that goal.
However this is not the case. Funding is a constraint for the
item manager at the TCP imposed by policy makers, for example.
So, item managers are making utility maximizing decisions at that
level to try to achieve an 85% SMA, and satisfy customer demands
subject to a budget constraint imposed by policy makers. This
begins to describe the much broader context of the problem of
service levels versus funding that is examined in the following
sections.
D. CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES AND DIFFERENT DECIS ION-MAKING
ENVIRONMENTS
Unit commanders, inventory managers, and other retail, or
end users of the items procured by item managers at the Navy ICP
have a much different view of what is an acceptable service
level. For the end user, the goal with respect to inventory
management is to maximize readiness. 85% SMA, or a 15% chance of
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stockout, is not consistent with the operator's objective of
maximizing readiness. Higher, even 100%, service levels are
desired from his or her perspective, and failure to attain the
highest possible service levels are viewed harshly by those who
are accountable and who are evaluated on the resulting
performance. The failure to attain the highest levels of service
or readiness will result in increasingly severe consequences. It
would surely reflect very poorly on a unit supply officer for
example, who fails to have a critical part on hand when it's
required in an operational environment where tolerance for this
type of failure is close to zero. In the customer's or end
user's environment, lives and careers can be at stake.
The service levels expected and demanded by operating
commanders approaches 100%; whereas the 85% SMA that is a goal,
or the 75% that is currently funded is totally unacceptable to
the unit commander, or any other accountable end user of
inventory items. This is exacerbated by the fact that current
funding levels are driving even lower service levels. It can be
seen that a rational decision maker at this level would clearly
be willing to "pay more" to avoid these high personal stockout
costs, and this understandably leads to higher inventory levels
being procured and maintained by risk adverse inventory managers
to support the higher service levels required by the end user.
The incentives stemming from the environment surrounding policy
maker desires, item manager risk adverse decisions, and customer
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service level demands are not synchronized to produce harmonious
results. The resulting conflicts in the incentives and
motivations between these perspectives explains why item managers
face such a difficult process.
E. A MODEL RELATING STOCKOUT COSTS, SERVICE LEVELS AND FUNDING
CONCERNS
When considering the different levels of management in the
inventory process, a general trend can be seen where the service
levels desired increase as one descends down the hierarchy from
policy makers to the operating forces. Policy makers face a
"big picture" perspective, and must not only consider readiness
issues, but also be focused on inventory holding/ordering costs,
as well as the other budgetary realities in Navy inventory
management. The customer/operator however, comes from the
perspective of doing "whatever it takes" to support maximum
readiness, and will spend accordingly in support of this goal.
Therefore, as one moves down the hierarchy, consideration over
inventory costs decline, while demand for required service levels
increase. Tolerance for failure to achieve high service levels,
and the personal stockout costs associated also increase. Lastly
the concern for, and focus on, cost and funding to support
service levels decrease as one descends down the hierarchy from
policy making to the operators.
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1. The Inventory Management Decision-Making Environment
Model
In general, the service levels expected and desired tend to
increase as one descends from policy making to operating forces
and end users; personal stockout costs also tend to increase. In
contrast, concern or focus for inventory costs and budgetary
issues tend to decrease. As one descends through the hierarchy,
the decision-making/planning horizon also tends to decrease. At
higher levels of management and policy making, the scope is
broader and the outlook must consider a greater time range,
whereas operators are focused on the day to day activities that
characterize the nature of their job. These general
relationships can be seen in the model shown in Figure 2.
This model symbolizes the Navy inventory management
structure with higher level policy makers at the top and
operators to the bottom. Item managers at the ICP are
interpreted to be in the middle, facing a decision-making
environment that reflects the conflicting incentive structure
facing customers and policy makers. Item managers are akin to
agents for the customers they serve, as this is their motivation
for doing a good job. However, they are also subject to many
constraints in how they do their jobs, as they must execute the
policies promulgated and achieve the goals set, while being held
accountable to established policy and procedure.
23
Figure 2 : Inventory Management Decision-Making Environment Model
This model shows the important relationship between stockout
costs, service levels, and cost considerations at the different
levels of inventory management and use.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter discussed stockout costs and their impact on
decision makers behavior. The model presented shows that
expected service levels tend to increase as one descends from
policy makers to the operating forces (end users) , and personal
stockout costs also tend to increase, while concern or focus on
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inventory costs and budgetary issues tend to decrease. And
lastly, the decision-making/planning horizon tends to decrease.
There is a relationship between readiness and the primary
inventory management performance indicator, supply material
availability (SMA) . SMA is one surrogate measure of
effectiveness for readiness, and decision makers trying to
achieve SMA goals or "maximum readiness" will be subject to the
personal stockout costs related to not meeting those goals. At
the same time, these decision makers also will not be rewarded
for saving the inventory costs associated with lower
readiness/SMA. Both SMA and readiness have influence over
rational decision makers who are reacting to their environments
The concept described by the model has important
ramifications in understanding why decision makers at different




IV. COSTS, READINESS, AND INCENTIVES
A. INTRODUCTION
The performance indicators and goals related to inventory
management tend to measure and favor readiness, with little or no
consideration given to inventory cost. Cost concerns are
primarily handled at higher policy making levels, and these
considerations are generally not conveyed down to lower levels,
where decision makers and operators are primarily responsible
for, and evaluated on readiness issues, with bigger picture
inventory costs not being a concern. This is the primary
conflict in perspective.
The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) , Vice
Admiral William J. Hancock, USN recently stated that:
(SMA, COSAL effectiveness, and POE) measure our
performance, but not always the impact of our efforts...
you need to develop performance measures that clearly
link funding to ICP, supply system and operating force
performance. [Ref.9]
He also stated:
We can no longer concern ourselves with just making
the customer happy... we must risk 'disappointing the
customer.' We must be willing to make changes that add
risk to our ability to meet previous support standards.
[Ref.9]
These statements cut to the heart of the issue of readiness
versus funding, and illustrates a real world recognition of the
problems created by the existing performance indicators, such as
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SMA, that influence undesired behavior like maintaining higher
inventory levels. Also revealed here is the acknowledgement of
the customer's desire for the highest levels of readiness, and
risk-adverse, utility-maximizing inventory management decision
makers concerned with ensuring these levels are available to the
customer regardless of the cost. Part of the solution must be in
integrating desire for the highest possible readiness with frugal
stewardship of the Navy's limited budget resources.
This chapter discusses inventory management cost focus, cost
versus readiness, risk, and the current incentives and
performance measures which influence behavior. These issues are
then related to the Inventory Management Decision-Making
Environment Model.
B. READINESS VERSUS COST
Most of the key performance measures or "prime indicators"
for inventory management effectiveness are based on readiness.
They promote higher readiness, and generally do not consider
inventory costs or budget concerns. However, budget issues do
indeed drive policy making for inventory management.
Navy ICP funding is primarily based on demand, or sales to
customers [Ref.9]. The more inventory that fleet customers
demand, the more budget dollars that are available to the ICP to
fund the purchase and repair of inventory items. There is
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currently a particularly tight budget environment throughout the
Navy where funding is the primary constraint to what can be done
in inventory management. The importance of budget concerns can
be seen in its affect on inventory management decisions.
Since the beginning of FY 97, item managers at the NAVICP,
Philadelphia have been executing purchases of selected items with
no safety levels [Ref. 10]. This means that purchase decisions
are based on forecasts from historical demand alone, and that any
variation in actual demand will not be able to be met with
"safety stock." This decision was made in response to limited
funding available to achieve desired inventory (service) levels.
Although customer/end user desires were considered in the
decision, as the Type Commanders (TYCOMS) were involved with the
ICP execution strategy and had input on which items would be
fully procured with safety levels and which others would not be,
clearly this action would not have occurred if funding had not
been such a constraint.
Additionally, customers are currently demanding fewer items,
primarily due to funding decreases. This is affecting the Navy
ICP in that they may not meet the sales goals and projections
that their budgets were based on, and this further complicates
their already austere funding environment.
This is just one current example where it is seen that
funding alone can drive inventory decision-making. Funding is a
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constraint here, but it has not changed the motivations or
incentives that influence decision-making.
C. REACTIONS TO FUNDING CONSTRAINTS
Consequences of the decision on safety levels as outlined
above are yet to be seen. This is for two primary reasons:
First, the effect on repairable items could be negligible since
the decision only affects purchases, and not the ongoing repair
process. The most significant impact will be on consumable
items. Secondly, any effects will not likely be felt until a
full procurement lead time has passed for the items concerned,
which could be up to 12 to 18 months. However, one can
understand that having no safety levels for selected items will
eventually affect demand on these items due to customer reaction
to increased incidences of shortages.
Considering the model presented in Chapter III, it would
follow that increased stockouts as a result of maintaining zero
safety levels will elicit different responses from decision
makers at different levels. Item managers are currently making
"tradeoffs" to maximize readiness on the items under their
responsibility with the limited funds that are available. They
purchase items that have the greatest positive affect on meeting
SMA goals and delay purchases on other items as long as there is
no serious degradation of support to the customer [Ref.9].
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Customers may respond to a perceived decrease in support
caused by item managers being unable to purchase safety level
quantities of items by increasing their demand on some items and
perhaps maintaining their own safety levels to preclude
stockouts . The model illustrates that the operators' required
service levels are higher, their personal stockout costs are
higher, and their planning/decision-making horizon is shorter,
which explains their reaction to low safety stock levels. Item
managers, as agents for the customer, respond accordingly in that
their desire, or utility maximizing decision-making, is to ensure
that the needs of their customers are met.
D. RISK
VADM Hancock's mention of risk in the statement above is a
key issue in reducing the disparity between what policy makers
accept and fund for inventory in support of readiness, and what
the operators and customers of inventory items desire and work
towards. Because so many of the inventory management decision
makers in the Navy are influenced by readiness-based performance
indicators, cost issues become secondary. Operators want to be
"up and running" 100% of the time, and have little tolerance for
anything less, as this is what they are evaluated on. Item
managers, although constrained somewhat by funding and other
regulations, as agents for the customer, also desire the highest
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possible readiness for customers. Only by removing or decreasing
the risk involved with not meeting these objectives, can true
improvements be made where cost factors can become important to
decision makers.
As the model suggests, these risks are highest for the
operators, as the service levels they require, and the stockout
costs they incur by not meeting these service levels, are
highest. Only fundamental changes in the environment of
incentives and penalties can influence these decision makers to
accept more risk by accepting lower service levels, and
ultimately lower inventory levels. Only a fundamental change in
the management environment that influences the benefits and costs
of making risky decisions will bring risk adverse decision makers
actions in line with policy maker preferences. The acceptance of
and interpretation of risk at all levels is therefore key to the
inventory management solution.
E. SUMMARY
Important questions in considering cost versus readiness
issues include: What is the desired level of readiness, and what
level of readiness can the Navy afford? If the answers to these
questions are not similar, there is a disconnect. Additionally,
there will be different responses to these questions based on who
is asked, policy makers or operators, and based on the
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environment they must work in. This is the conflict in
objectives that makes establishing a coordinated goal for
inventory management across all levels so difficult.
Although funding is not a "prime indicator" for inventory
managers as is SMA, it can indeed influence decision-making
significantly. The problem is, however, simply putting a
constraint on funds for inventory is not a viable solution over
the long term. Indicators used currently like SMA, number of
backorders, and average customer wait time (ACWT) which promote
readiness, must also be linked to funding and cost concerns.
This focus must become important to the decision makers that
implement inventory management decisions so that their utility
maximizing decisions include cost considerations. Also, risk
must be addressed to reduce personal stockout costs and encourage
less risk adverse behavior.
This chapter discussed the issue of readiness versus cost,
the importance of funding and risk to inventory management, and
showed the relationship between these issues to the model





Chapter III introduced the Inventory Management Decision-
Making Model that showed a disparity in service levels required,
personal stockout costs, cost or budget focus, and the
planning/decision-making horizon over the inventory management
levels in the Navy. The purpose of this conceptual model and the
discussion that followed in Chapter IV was to provide an
understanding of the environmental factors that influence Navy
inventory management decision-making, and what issues must be
addressed to facilitate improvements in the system. This chapter
discusses the validation of the model to ensure that it
adequately describes the actual Navy inventory management system.
B. VALIDATION
Validation is defined as "substantiation that (a model)
within its domain of applicability possesses a satisfactory range
of accuracy consistent with the intended application of the
model" [Ref . 13:p. 104] . Validation has also been described as a
"process of reaching an acceptable level of confidence that the
inferences drawn from the model are correct and applicable to the
real-world system being represented" [Ref . 12 :p . 129] . Although
the issues of personal stockout costs, required service levels.
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etc... illustrated by this model are difficult to quantify, the
description of the decision-making environment that it provides
can be evaluated conceptually and intuitively.
Basically, validation focuses on three questions:
1. Does the model represent the real-world system?
(conceptual validity)
2. Does the model's ultimate user have confidence in the
model's results? (intuitive, believability)
3. Are the model-generated behavioral data characteristic
of the real-world system's behavioral data? (operational
validity). [Ref . 12 :p. 147]
The purpose of the model is to show the relationship of
service levels, stockout costs, cost focus, and the
planning/decision-making horizon over all the inventory
management levels in the Navy. The model's adequacy or validity
must be evaluated in terms of this purpose, and be judged in
relationship to the real system [Ref . 12 :p. 147, 8]
.
The key to this validation process is to determine if the
model represents the inventory management decision-making
environment accurately. To accomplish this. Department of Navy
personnel who are involved with inventory management decisions at
various levels were interviewed. Their responses were recorded,
and compared on questions dealing with required service levels,
personal stockout costs, cost focus, and their planning/decision-




Forty-six Department of Navy (DoN) personnel were
interviewed with the questions summarized below, and provided in
full in Appendix B. All questions were on a scale from 1 to 9
except for the third question, which asked for a percentage:
1. What is the severity of the penalty or consequence for
over-ordering or purchasing excess inventory?
2. What is the severity of the penalty or consequence for
under-ordering or purchasing insufficient inventory?
3. What is the service level that you require, or is
required of you in terms of material availability
percentage?
4. What is the severity of the consequence of not meeting
.
the service level expected or required of you?
5. To what extent would you tend to purchase more inventory
to avoid the risk of stockout versus accepting the risk of
stockout by purchasing less? 1 being fully avoiding all
risk by purchasing whatever is necessary, 9 being fully
excepting all risk by purchasing the absolute minimum
required.
6. Considering readiness versus cost from your point of
view, to what extent does cost or budget considerations play
in purchase decisions? 1 being readiness is the overriding
concern, 9 being that cost or budget considerations are the
overriding concern.
7. What is the typical time horizon you consider with
respect to your purchase plans/decisions, or how far out do
you "look" in planning and executing your requirements? 1
being day to day, 9 being a year or more.
The questions were designed to query Navy personnel with
varied backgrounds and experience in inventory management on the
issues and environment described by the conceptual model
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presented in this thesis. The focus of the questions was to
contrast the different responses of ICP personnel from customers,
or end users. The opinions and concerns of high level policy
makers including Congress and senior civilian leadership in the
Navy are well documented in a number of GAO reports on inventory
management [Ref s . 1, 2, 14, 15, 16] .
Respondents from "middle-level" inventory management
positions consisted of Navy ICP personnel with considerable
experience in inventory management including Program Branch
Heads, Lead Item Managers (LMS) , Item Managers (IMS), and other
Inventory Management Specialists with purchasing experience at
the ICP level. Their responses to the questions in Appendix B on
a scale of one to nine, except for question #3 which is in
percentage, were averaged and are presented in table 2. The raw
data obtained is presented in Appendix C.
Question #
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4.43 6.33 83.1% 6.24 4.71 4.38 8.62
Table 2: Average ICP Survey Responses
The operators and customers (end-users) that were queried
also came from a diverse background and had different levels of
experience in inventory management. However, most had
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significant purchasing, contracting, and/or inventory management
experience, and included Supply Corps Officers, Aviation
Maintenance Officers, Surface Line, and Special Operations
Officers. The averages of their responses are summarized in
table 3. The raw data obtained is presented in Appendix D.
Question #
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3.68 7.32 94.9% 7.20 3.64 3.36 3.72
Table 3: Average Operator/Customer Survey Responses
D. EVALUATION OF THE DATA
Each question between the TCP and customer personnel was
determined to be significantly different at the 95% confidence
level assuming a normal distribution of responses. However, a
more vigorous method was used to test for statistical
significance. The Mann-Whitney U Test, which is a nonparametric
rank sum technique, was used [Ref. 17 :p. 604-8] . A spreadsheet
program was utilized to rank the data first by group then by
observation value, and run the U statistic for each set of data.




Where: ni=nuirLber of customer sample responses
n2=n-ii[rLber of ICP sample responses
Ri=sum of the ranks of customer responses
R2=sum of the ranks of ICP responses
The mean of the U statistic was computed as:
|a^=nin2/2
And the standard error of the U statistic was computed as:
au=[nin2(ni+n2+l)/12]-^
However, to account for observations with tied scores, a
correction is used for the standard error. This correction is
available for use since the large sample of N=46 represents an
approximation to the normal curve [Ref . 18 :p. 124] . The correction
for ties is:
o^=([nin2/N(N-l)] [N5-N/12-ST] ) -^
Where: N=ni+n2
T=t^-t/12 (t being the number of observations tied for
a given rank)
Ho: That responses are from the same population.
Hg: That responses are from different populations.
Observations were ranked, and any tied observations received
the average rank for all tied observations. The U Test value is
then compared to the high and low values 1.96 standard errors
around the mean to see if there is significant difference
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(at 95% confidence) in the observations. Test results are
contained in Appendix E.
All seven questions were tested to see if there was a
significant difference between the ICP and customer responses.
These are U Tests 1 through 7. Additionally, two more tests were
completed to see if there was a significant difference between
questions one and two for both sets of respondents. These are U
Tests 8C and 91. Seven of the nine tests passed the U Test at a
95% confidence interval, showing there is a difference between
the two populations surveyed.
1. Consequences of over ordering.
The results of the first test show that the consequence for
over ordering is low for both ICP and customer respondents, and
that there is not a significant difference between the two
groups
.
The ICP respondents showed more of an overall concern for
over ordering (4.43) compared to customers with a average
response of 3.68, but both these responses were still below the
neutral response of 5. This demonstrates that, although there
was some recognition of consequence for over buying, it appears
that the case of under buying, or insufficient inventory had the
most profound consequence to all. This was one of two tests that
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did not pass the U Test at a 95% or 90% confidence interval,
showing there is no significant difference between the two
groups
.
2. Consequences of under ordering.
The results of the second test show that both groups see
high consequences for under ordering, and that there is a
significant difference between the two groups. For customers,
the consequence for under ordering is significantly higher than
for ICP personnel, and this result passed the U Test at a 95%
confidence. The ICP concern for supporting the customer is seen
in this high average response for the consequence of under
ordering (6.33 vs. 7.32). Despite this general feeling among
respondents, it was also noted that, other than customer support
and their obligation to support maximum readiness, there was
perceived less consequence for under ordering, or not having
sufficient stock due to the austere funding climate currently
being experienced.
Test 8C showed that the customer sees a significant
difference between the consequence of over and under ordering,
and that the consequence for under ordering is greater for the
customer than for ICP personnel. There was a statistically
significant spread between the responses on the first two
questions within the customer group, again, showing they feel
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less of a consequence for over ordering and a greater consequence
for under ordering. The U Test confirmed this at a 95%
confidence interval
.
Test 91 showed that the ICP sees no significant difference
between over and under ordering. There was less of a spread
between the two questions for the ICP respondents, and the spread
implies there may be a difference in the consequences for over
ordering and under ordering. However, this difference did not
prove to be statistically significant as U Test 91 was the second
of the nine tests to fail at the 95% confidence level.
3. Service levels.
The third question dealt with required service levels.
Clearly, the customers responded that they required, or were
required to have high service levels (94.9%). The 83.1% average
that was received from ICP personnel was the result of the
respondents' acknowledgement of SMA goals, and actual funding
available to meet these goals. Although a small number of ICP
personnel responded that 90% or more was the required service
levels, most expressed frustration that the funding realities
constrained the service levels below what they should be in terms
of readiness. The general feeling was that the ICP would support
the customer with the highest possible service levels subject to
the funding constraint.
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Customers on the other hand, expected and required higher
service levels. The average expected level of 94.9% however, is
clearly out of sync with the currently executed 75%-80% that is
funded, or even with the overall goal of 85%. The service levels
which are being funded and executed at the ICP level are
unacceptably low to the customer. This may reinforce risk
adverse behavior, and specifically result in higher demand levels
from the customer to compensate for the perceived shortfall in
service. The U Test revealed that the average responses for this
question were significantly different at a 95% confidence level.
4. Penalty for not meeting service levels.
Both groups of respondents, ICP and customers, noted a
significant penalty for not meeting service levels (6.24, 7.20
respectively) . This interestingly resembled the average
responses received from both on the consequence for under
ordering inventory. There appears to be a connection between not
achieving (service) goals and the consequence for under ordering
according to the respondents. The average responses for this
question also passed the U Test at a 95% confidence level.
The general view from ICP respondents was that they try to
support the customer to the maximum extent, and it is felt that
falling short of that goal has a significant consequence. There
was also a considerable response indicating that SMA
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specifically, is a particularly important performance measure at
this time which is being closely watched, so there was some extra
sensitivity to this question.
On the other hand, those who felt a lesser consequence for
missing the required service levels stated that because of the
particularly austere funding environment, it was "OK" to come up
short because "who can really be expected to meet the levels with
current funding?" However, again, the majority of respondents
from the ICP had a sincere concern for satisfying service levels
or SMA, and felt there was a consequence for not achieving that.
The average customer response was also higher than neutral,
indicating the importance of service levels, and was even greater
than the average ICP response, showing that the consequences are
even greater at the customer level as described by the model.
5. Risk of stockout.
Both groups of respondents, ICP and customers, also noted
the rational tendency to avoid the risk of stockout by
"purchasing whatever is required" (4.71, 3.64 respectively).
Again, the intuitive result described by the conceptual model
that this would be more pronounced at the customer level proved
true. In both cases however, these responses underscored the
finding that decision makers tend to be risk adverse in their
purchase behavior. The U Test revealed that the average
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responses for this question were significantly different at a 95%
confidence level.
6. Readiness versus cost.
Both groups of respondents, ICP and customers, stated a
tendency towards supporting readiness with respect to budget
considerations in purchase decisions (4.38, 3.36 respectively).
Again, as described by the model, these responses showed a more
pronounced condition at the customer level.
Many of the ICP respondents noted that funding drives the
level of readiness in terms of procurement, and had a tendency to
give a neutral answer of 5. Also, it is felt that striking a
balance between readiness and cost to the best of their ability
is their job despite any imposed funding constraint. The average
responses for this question passed the U Test at a 95% confidence
level.
7. Planning/decision-making horizon.
As expected, there is a significant contrast in the
planning/decision-making horizons between ICP personnel and the
operator/customer (8.62 vs. 3.72), and the average responses for
this question passed the U Test at a 95% confidence level. At
the ICP, most decision makers are looking out "at least one lead
time away" in planning their requirements, which can be 12 to 24
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months for many items. Whereas the customer is more attuned to
daily requirements and the consequent need for quicker response.
E. SUMMARY
The results from the number of surveys conducted on both ICP
personnel and customers/end users show that the model presented
in this thesis does indeed reflect the Navy inventory system
accurately, and that the inferences drawn are meaningful. Seven
of the nine questions compared for statistical significance
passed the Mann-Whitney U Test. This shows that there is a
significant difference between the two populations surveyed.
Although operational validity was not explored, the conceptual
nature of the environment that the model describes was validated.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
This thesis discussed the Navy inventory management
decision-making environment and several of the key issues that
influence inventory management decision makers.
Decision-making under uncertainty, utility theory, and risk
aversion were discussed in terms of inventory management in
Chapter II. Utility theory illustrated that individuals making
rational decisions will seek to maximize the value of their own
personal utility given the constraints placed upon them by the
environments they work in. There are factors that affect the
decision-making and risk taking behavior of rational inventory
managers and therefore can influence inventory management
behavior. It was also noted that Navy item managers, and
decision makers in general, are risk adverse due to the nature of
the environment that influences their behavior.
Chapter III described personal stockout costs as a
consequence of a shortage that can affect an individual's utility
function. This was shown to be a key factor in influencing
decision-making and risk adverse behavior in Navy inventory
management. The performance indicators that influence inventory
managers were discussed and it was shown how they encourage
higher levels of inventory. Also, the conflicting objectives
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between the different decision-making environments was
introduced. A model was presented which showed that expected
service levels tend to increase as one descends from policy
makers to end users, and personal stockout costs also tend to
increase, while the concern for, or focus on inventory costs and
budgetary issues tend to decrease.
Chapter IV discussed performance indicators and goals that
influence inventory management behavior and tend to measure and
favor readiness, with little or no consideration given to cost.
Cost focus, cost versus readiness, and risk were all discussed
and related to the Inventory Management Decision-Making
Environment Model. Lastly, in Chapter V, the questions used in
the survey to verifying the model environment passed seven of
nine tests for statistical significance using the Mann-Whitney U
Test, showing that the model is conceptually accurate in
adequately describing the decision-making environment in Navy
inventory management at the ICP and end user levels, and that
there is a difference between the two populations in the way they
perceive their environment.
B. CONCLUSIONS
There are two primary conclusions as a result of this
research. They are:
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1. The readiness-based performance measures that influence
inventory manager behavior must be changed to incorporate a
cost focus.
2. The risk facing inventory managers with respect to
personal stockout costs must be decreased to change behavior
due to risk adverse decision-making.
1. Conclusion one: Performance measures
If reduction of inventory levels is to be achieved, it must
not only be made a goal for all inventory decision makers to
achieve, but the performance measures that influence and motivate
decision makers must be changed to incorporate cost
considerations, not just readiness, in purchase decisions.
There is nothing wrong with measuring readiness, for
readiness is what the military is about. However, in order to
meaningfully reduce inventory levels without degrading readiness
as policy makers, such as the senior Navy civilian leadership so
adamantly desire, inventory cost concerns must become an internal
motivation along with readiness concerns for all decision makers.
It is evident from the responses obtained from ICP personnel that
controlling inventory purchasing levels with budget constraints
is not sustainable over the long term as readiness will clearly
be degraded.
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2. Conclusion two: Risk
Validation of the model illustrated that there is a
considerable aversion to risk. ICP personnel resist failing the
customer, and customers are clearly focused on readiness alone.
In both cases, there is a high personal stockout cost to not
achieving their respective goals. Readiness must be maintained,
but the current environment encourages supporting readiness with
little concern over inventory costs. Were it not for constraints
on funding, decision makers would purchase up to capacity to
maximize readiness. However, readiness is currently being
determined more by flawed performance measures such as SMA, and
not by actual readiness indicators such as "How many planes are
up?" The operator is focused on these types of readiness issues,
however the personal stockout costs are very high. The
readiness-biased decision environment facing inventory managers,
combined with their risk adverse behavior, drives the result of
"maximum readiness" at any cost. This leads to the phenomenon of
"local optimization" where everybody is trying to achieve maximum
support for their own operations without regard for expense and
inventory cost inefficiencies across the entire Navy.
This is actually rational behavior in that decision makers
are doing what it takes to achieve their goals by reacting to the
decision environment in which they work in such a way as to be
personally successful. Incorporating inventory cost measures
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into the performance measures used to evaluate inventory managers
would promote a more global perspective.
Changing the performance measures by which Navy inventory
management decision makers are evaluated could be achieved by
incorporating inventory cost considerations along with readiness
measures. The resulting effort to reduce the personal stockout
costs experienced by these personnel would generate improvements
to the inventory system by effectively maintaining the required
levels of readiness, while tackling the necessary task of
reducing overall inventory levels and the resulting costs that
have recently been under scrutiny by high-level policy makers.
C. FURTHER RESEARCH
This research focused on the Navy inventory managers'
decision-making environment and the factors that can influence
their purchasing behavior. Areas for additional research
suggested by this thesis include developing several cost-based
performance measures and incorporating cost factors into the
current readiness-based indicators, and testing their potential
affect on Navy inventory managers at all levels. Another
suggested area is developing initiatives that can reduce risk, or
personal stockout costs for decision makers, and testing their
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The predominant cause of excess
\\Wch encompasses the complete
forecast for matoial and supplies.
Forecasting methods at the ICP's
may vary however, in general use
variations of both the weighted
moving average/exponeojtial
smoothing and economic order
quantity models to determine a
forecast ofdemand Variability in
the procurement cycle is reduced
by consideration of other factors
designed to compensate for safety,
repair cycle, administrative lead
times, production lead times, war
reserves, and contingency &
economic retention points. The
result is called the requirements
stack (scries of all the procurable
elements of inventory) which
leads to the Requirements
Objective or RO. Inventay levels
exceeding the RO are considered
excess or as DLA. calls it,
"Material for Potential
Reutilization."
1) At the retail level, causes encompass a wide range of activities
resulting from outdated technical manuals, poor preventive maintenance
procedures, faulty quality assurance, poor execution of request turn-in
procedures, inadequate catalog/status/ reconcihation measures, training,
and more. The following examples are provided
(A) Failure of the unit to tum-in items in a timely manner causes the
system to replenish unnecessarily.
(B) When units order the wrong part, it later becomes excess.
(C) Poor Prescribed Load List (PLL) management by the PLL clerk.
(D) Icqjrc^jer ULL's processing (e.g. failure to update the catalogue, not
receiving or updating daily status, failure to pick up parts routinely and
processing their receipt).
(E) Lade of quality assurance checks. The system allows PEL clerks to
initiate multiple requests against open/due-in and/or unauthorized parts.
(F) Unserviceable parts returned to the vendor may result in the ordering
of new parts. The parts may later be determined serviceable and the new
items then become excess.
(G) Limited capacities at the DS/GS repair levels can result in the item
being procured from the wholesale activity versus repair.
(H) Restrictive measures on the number of items authorized for tum-in
nuy cause other units in need of the part to requisition new items.
(I) Units order repair parts based on anticipated need versus demand
history. Funds are the opportumt>' to get well on current maintenance
problems.
(J) After requests are passed to the wholesale activity as a dedicated due-
in/due-oul, there is no method to permit a tum-in to be issued against that
requirement and a carKellattcxi of the origmal requisition to be submitted.
Consequently, the item may be on-hand but unissuable.
(K) Inaccurate stock location data files.
(L) Failure to properly reconcile the monthly reconcilianon report
provided by the Ehrect Support Unit. Many units do not work the report
in a timch' manner, if at all. WTicn thcr>,' don't work the report, thev' do not
know what is being received released for issue, or still open, so thc\' may
be ordering part^ already on order If a substitute item shows up on the
report, thc>- order the part again, thinking it uas an error, without
checking the AMDF.
(M) Requisitions arc placed in tlic s>slcm for anticipated requirements
(e.g. training, deployments) that don't materialize Items may be later







(N) E}q)iration of shelf life of an item prior to issue causes the item to
be re-ordered and the old items now become excess.
(O) Off-line requisitions are too easily accessible at the lower levels of
supply. Automated requisitions are being processed through normal
channels while the same is being ordered through off-line channels (e.g.
local purchase, high priority call-ins, manual; walk-through).
(P) At the end of each FY, it is a normal practice to hold requisitions
due to resource ccmstraints. The increase in the order ship time (OST)
will cause stockage levels to increase. This will result in the
expmditure of funds to fill the RO. When OST returns to naraal, the
RO drops and the items become excess.
2) Changes in retail demand; any ofthe factors relating to safety,
lepak cycle, administrative lead times, production lead times, war
reserves, and contingency & economic retention points; and to the
Natiwial Military Strategy can effect inventory levels. Cancellation of
procurements may not be economical or possible. —
-
Lack ofAsset Refers to the inability to see
Visibihty inventory assets either latCTally
(across military componeats e.g.
DLA, NAVICP, AMC) or
vertically (firom the
depot/distribution activity to flic
user level). Created by stovq>ipc
systems which are tailored meet
the specific needs ofthe individual
users. There is a black hole
between the ASL and PLL. These
systems do not interface. They
don't use common data elements.
The lack of asset visibility limits
the ability to match assets with
requirements. Leads to a large
number of multiple use
items/redund'ancy in procurement
actions.





Widioutknowingtbe total assets and requirements, the ability ofDLA to
provide timely weapon system siq>p<xt in a oisis is at risk. Redundancy
occurs. For example, filters needed to support one component may be
sitting in anodic components warehouse. However, new filters will be
procured to supp<»t the requirement DLA cannot see the filtos are
sitting on the shelfwithin the other activity.
2) 69 Modular radio transmitters owned by the Army and stored at
WamerRobbinsAFB valued at approximately $14,000. The Air Force
had made no attempts to get disposition authority firom the Army.
3) Inhibits the ability to match excess inventories previously sold to
DRMO with current requirements. For example, wiring harnesses
previously sold to DRMO may later be required due the extended life of
systems.
4) Loss of accountability of in transit assets at all levels. For example, in
the Army, assets (tum-ins and receipts) are processed and become
redistributable daily. At this p>oint visibility and accountability are lost.
Items on hand are dropped fi-om the DS/SARRS ABF files for turn-in to
the next hi^Kr level and due-ins are not established at that level. Another
request may be received which causes either a passbg action or
replenishment requisition. A unit ordering a part or an authorized
stockage list (ASL) rtplenishmeat document will not have the opportunity
to capture an issue &om an in transit asset Requisitions in turn go the
wholesale activity and new parts are procured. When the in transit parts







Caused by undue Command
influence stemming from a
philosophy of "Readiness At Any
Cost. " The emphasis at the unit
level is on readiness. The
"Firstest With The Mostest" is
the winner concept. Individual
Commanders are rated on
readiness, so their policies lean
toward quick inspections and
inflated demand. Customers do
not trust the system to provide
what they need. Material
availability plays a significant
role in readiness capability.
Procurement specialists m^
over-order and hoard s^jplies
(just in case inventories). The
result is bottlenecks, procurement
delays, and new excess material.
Additionally, the current system
ofcredits for tum-in of repairables
at the retail level serves as a disr
incentive. Many items do not
receive fiili credit The users
incentive is to retain the item.
1) Order three to insure one. During Operation Desert Storm, lessons
learned indicate the 24th Infantry Division was provided three weeks
notice prior to deployment of the first combat units. The emphasis on
material availability resulted in procurement specialists placing orders
tw'O and three times to insure receipt of the item. The resulting strain on
the s^jply system was sufficiently great to se\'erely impede the abihty to
support later deploying units. The problem was compounded as other
units repeated the process. By the time the system was able to recover,
over 40,00 Sea land Containers were dehvered to Saudi Arabia. Only
about halfof these containers were ever opened.
2) Generally, users have a low opinion of and little confidence in the
logistics system. Therefore, they plan on self sufficiency.
1) In some cases, it m^ be more advantageous for retail procurement
specialists to hide material versus turning items in for credit Why turn
an item in and receive 80% a-edit vrbea you know you will be ordering it








sometimes the contractor makes
the wrong guess on the number of
lines to support system. MTBF
may vary from the estimates. The
contractors incentive is to
maximize the Interim Support List
(ISL). The greater the number of
lines on the contractors ISL, the
greater the profit.
Design instability ofnew weapons
systems may result in product
modificafions. Modifications may
render the initial spares obsolete.
Life of Type Buys refer to the
procurement of all the spares
necessary to support the weapons
systems during its projected life
cycle. The goal is to ensure
EKDD's capability to maintain
support for the system long after
the contractor production facilities
have shut down. Many of these
spares may never be used.
1) The first two years of a new weapon system are basically an
engineers best guess. The defense contractor for the B-2 bomber
recommended 6,000 line items to support the initial procurement of
spares for the aircraft. Of these 6,000 items on the contractors ISL,
caily 400 have been used to date.
2) 13 modernization kits for the P-3C aircraft valued at $4,480 each
and stored at the Fleet Industrial Supply Center, Norfolk, Virginia have
been in storage since 1978.
3) There are 7 obsolete clutch assemblies previously used on the Ml25
10 ton Prime Mover and valued at $5,334 stored at the Defense Supply
Depot, New Cumberland, Pennsylvania
4) Results in an attitude that ifyou can't buy it back cheaply, don't
dispose of it. There's a lot of private junkj'ards that will be happy to
sell it back to.
5) Aircraft vanes and blades can be repaired for a while. Howc^'e^,
when they finally need replacement, there's no demand in the system.








and closings always identify
inventory not on the accountable
records. Therefore, inventories
may exceed the Requirements
Objective. Items at a BRAC'd
base stratify to excess after 2
years.
Loss of trained IM personnel.
1) DLA closings at Memphis, Utah, & Columbus resulted in excess.
2) Letterkeny states the lack of people/ manpower has pre-en^ted their
ability to conduct a full inventory since 1986. 'We'll find a lot of
inventory we didn 't know we had when we close down.
"
1) At the US Army, Training and Doctrine Command installations, the
drawdown resulted in a number of inexperienced item managers taking
the exit bonus and leaving the federal workforce. New/inexperienced
item managers (GS-5) entered the workforce. Training is dependant on
fimdingandpricdties. Still further, DLA indicates they have received no
interns wi&in the last 5 years. About 2/3 's of their workf(xce will retire
within the next ten years.
2) At the Defense General Suppfy Center, Richmond, the number of lines
itemmanagers manage doubled, while the number of managec&.declined.
Support of
Allies
DOD's requirement to support
Allies (Foreign Mihtaiy Sales or
FMS) results in the retention of
unnecessary or obsolete
equipment Wholesale activities
must be able to support
requisitions for FMS spares NLT
330 days after submissioa
1) The Army began replacing the Commercial Utility Tactical Vehicles
(CUTV) with High Utility Mobile Vehicles (HUMMV) duringAe early
90's. CUTV's were turned in (on a one for one basis) to the st^pfy
system as the vehicles were fielded. These vehicles currently are sitting
at the Defense Depot Distribution Center, Letterkenny, ChambCTSburg,
Pennsylvania in anticipation of future FMS contracts. .
2) Approximately 100 short barrel, towed, 105mm howitzers left ovw
from the Vietnam War await disposition at the Defense Depot
Distribution Center, Letterkenny, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania in
anticipation of future FMS contracts.
3) FMS sales of Patriot Missile Batteries requires DoD to maintain 5
variations (w/supporting spares) of the equipment.
4) South Korea makes 155mra howitzer ammunition which thc>' sell to
foreign countries. However, their support for internal defense of the
country comes from the US. Their soldiers defend over 3/4's of the line
separating the North from the South.
5) G-Grant: Refers to the concept of giving inventory away to Allies that
cannot aflfonTto pa>'. For example, the recent fielding of obsolete aircraft
to Jordaa The US will retain a certain amount of spare part inventories
to support future requirements for these aircraft.
6) There are 2 electric pumps costing $45,000 each for destroyer class
ships no longer in service retained at the Fleet Industrial Supply Center,
Norfolk, VLrgiiua.
7) There arc 3 obsolete equalizers assemblies costing appro>dmately
$75,000 for the F4 aircraft reconnaissance system retained at the Warner






Certain items can have an adverse
impact on the environment or
economy.
I) The Defense Distribution Center, Lctterkenny, Pennsylvania retains
stockpiles of various ores (e.g. asbestos, lead, nickel, TALC, and zinc)
whir.h hflvft not h«m rfi<:pn<:p:H nf Thfrrr. arr both envirnnmmital and
economic issues to be addressed For example, sales on the open market
would have an advase impact on the market price. The Depot has
^proximatdy 137,967.9 tons ofthe material occiq)>ing some 1 . 1 milUon





DOD Item Managers sometimes
prematurely and imnecessarily
purchase ^v1lolesaIe iaventoiy of
consumable items and do not
always make the most prudent
decisions. Controls should focus
on: verification of requisition
demand coding, analysis and
evaluation of demand trends,
development of acquisition lead
times for consumables, and
improvement of controls over
reevaluating purchase decisions
1) A DoD lospectOT- General report dated 9 November 95 indicates ICP's
were prematurcfy and unnecessarily ordering viiolesale inventories of
consumable items. The reports states the conditions occurred because
management controls were ineCEixtive and did not ensure that inventory
managers always made the most prudent decisions. The rq)ort ccmchidal
that of the $1.06 billicm of consumable items that ICP's were in the
process of ordering (contracts not yet awarded in April 1994),
consumable material valued at $126.6 million (11.9 percent) exceeded
cunent requirements. Of this amount, approximately $88.9 million was
premature and $37.7 million was unnecessary. Tbo^fore, &&^voidable






As wholesale activities reduce the
administrative and procurement
leadtimes through iiq>roved
efficiency, the quantity of safety
inventories required to reduce
variability deaeases. Failure to
adjust the mathematical models
for the cess and SAMMS would
result in excess inventories. The
average cycle time for the Arary
procurement cycle is 23 days. The
Army is implementing a number
of initiatives to reduce cycle time
to 3 days.
1) DLA and AMC reductions in ALT/PLT have resulted in
procurements exceeding the RO.
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONS USED DURING VALIDATION
1. What is the severity of the penalty or consequence for over-
ordering or purchasing excess inventory?
On a scale from 1 to 9, 5 is the neutral response: 1, being no
penalty or consequence such as "Nothing happens" to 9, being the
highest penalty or consequence such as "I get fired."
2. What is the severity of the penalty or consequence for under-
ordering or purchasing insufficient inventory?
On a scale from 1 to 9, 5 is the neutral response: 1, being no
penalty or consequence such as "Nothing happens" to 9, being the
highest penalty or consequence such as "I get fired."
3. What is the service level that you require, or is required of
you in terms of material availability percentage?
4. What is the severity of the consequence of not meeting the
service level expected or required of you?
On a scale from 1 to 9, 5 is the neutral response: 1, being no
penalty or consequence such as "Nothing happens" to 9, being the
highest penalty or consequence such as "I get fired."
5. To what extent would you tend to purchase more inventory to
avoid the risk of stockout versus accepting the risk of stockout
by purchasing less?
On a scale from 1 to 9, 5 is the neutral response: 1, fully
avoiding risk by purchasing whatever is required, to 9, fully
accepting all risk by purchasing the minimum to save funds.
63
6. Considering readiness versus cost from your point of view, to
what extent does cost or budget considerations play in purchase
decisions?
On a scale from 1 to 9, 5 being the neutral response: 1,
readiness is the overriding concern, to 9, cost/budget
considerations is the overriding concern.
7. What is the typical time horizon being considered with
respect to your purchase plans/decisions, or how far out do you
consider in planning and executing your requirements?
On a scale from 1 to 9, 5 being the neutral response: 1, day-to-
day, to 9, a year or more.
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B. 6 8 75 7 3 6 9
C: 7 7 80 8 5 6 8
D: 3 6 85 4 4 3 9
E: 4 6 80 4 3 5 9
F: 3 7 85 7 7 5 9
G: 4 5 100 7 2 2 9
H: 5 8 75 6 4 7 9
I: 3 5 87 6 6 6 9
J. 6 8 80 8 6 3 9
K: 5 7 80 7 6 3 9
L- 2 6 80 5 4 3 9
M: 5 6 80 6 5 6 9
N : 2 5 85 6 5 3 9
0- 3 7 80 5 4 4 6
P 6 6 85 6 5 4 9
Q- 6 8 100 8 5 4 9
R : 5 4 85 3 3 3 9
S 5 7 84 6 5 5 5
T : 6 7 85 7 5 3 9
U 3 3 80 7 7 6 9
Totals : 93 133 1745 131 99 92 181
Mean: 4.4286 6.3333 83.095 6 .2381 4 .7143 4.381 8.619
Std. dev.: 1.4687 1.354 6.7075 1 .4108 1 .3093 1.431 1.0713
Std. error: 0.3205 0.2955 1.4637 .3079 .2857 0.3123 0.2338
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B: 1 7 90 7 2 2 3
C: 6 8 95 7 2 3 3
D: 4 7 95 7 3 4 3
E: 2 7 100 7 3 3 5
F: 3 8 95 8 3 4 5
G: 3 7 100 7 7 5 8
H: 5 8 85 7 6 5 2
I: 5 8 98 8 5 1 1
J: 4 6 95 9 4 3 5
K: 3 8 99 7 4 3 1
L, 2 8 95 8 3 2 3
M 3 8 95 8 4 3 5
N 5 5 95 5 4 6 4
5 7 90 9 3 4 5
P 6 7 94 7 2 2 5
Q 3 7 95 7 1 1 5
R : 5 8 100 8 5 5 5
S : 4 7 100 9 3 1 3
T : 5 8 95 5 7 7 3
U : 2 8 90 6 1 1 3
V : 1 7 95 7 5 5 3
W : 5 8 95 6 5 3 6
X : 5 7 98 7 2 5 1
Y : 3 7 98 8 4 3 3
Totals: 92 183 2372 180 91 84 93
Mean: 3.68 7.32 94.88 7.2 3.64 3.36 3.72
Std. dev. : 1.4922 0.7483 4.1765 1.0801 1.6299 1.6299 1.6713
Std. error:0.2984 0.1497 0.8353 0.216 0.326 0.326 0.3343
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C 333.5 5% SIG
C 2 5.5 I 3 14 5 MEAN 262.5 1.96 349 41
C 2 5.5 I 3 14 6 StciErr. 44.34 175 59
C 3 14 I 3 14 7 (corr. ) 10% SIG














c SUM T= 355.5
c 3 14 I 5 32 11
c 3 14 I 5 32 12 Ho: No difference
c 4 22.5 I 5 32 13 between the
c 4 22.5 I 5 32 14 populat ions.
c 4 22.5 I 5 32 15
c 5 32 I 6 42 16 Ha: A difference
c 5 32 I 6 42 17 between the
c 5 32 I 6 42 18 populations.
c 5 32 I 6 42 19
c 5 32 I 6 42 20
c 5 32 I 7 46 21
c 5 32 22
c 5 32 23
c 6 42 24
c 6 42 25
Note: The rank sum test for each question was completed on
a similar spreadsheet. However, the results for tests two
through nine are summarized on the following page.
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